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Reputation has been shown to provide an informal solution to the problem
of cooperation in human societies. After reviewing models that connect
reputations and cooperation, we address how reputation results from infor-
mation exchange embedded in a social network that changes endogenously
itself. Theoretical studies highlight that network topologies have different
effects on the extent of cooperation, since they can foster or hinder the flow
of reputational information. Subsequently, we review models and empirical
studies that intend to grasp the coevolution of reputations, cooperation and
social networks. We identify open questions in the literature concerning how
networks affect the accuracy of reputations, the honesty of shared information
and the spread of reputational information. Certain network topologies
may facilitate biased beliefs and intergroup competition or in-group identity
formation that could lead to high cooperation within but conflicts between
different subgroups of a network. Our review covers theoretical, experimental
and field studies across various disciplines that target these questions
and could explain how the dynamics of interactions and reputations help or
prevent the establishment and sustainability of cooperation in small- and
large-scale societies.
This article is part of the theme issue ‘The language of cooperation:
reputation and honest signalling’.1. Introduction
Despite its obvious benefits, cooperation necessarily entails individual sacrifices,
and so poses a fundamental puzzle for evolutionary theory, already alluded to by
Darwin [1;2, pp. 5–8]. Many breakthroughs in evolution, however, have been
achieved through cooperation and the formation of cooperative alliances [3].
For example, the transition from single-celled tomulticellular organisms required
the restriction of individual cell growth, cellular differentiation and the manage-
ment of cheating—cooperation between cells to create a functioning organism [4–
6]. Here, we focus our attention on cooperation in humans, as our species is par-
ticularly skilled in resolving cooperation problems and regularly cooperate with
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2non-kin strangers [7,8]. It has been a major scientific achieve-
ment to realize and empirically demonstrate that humans are
capable of solving the problem of cooperation through repu-
tation [9–14]. Reputation can be defined as (shared)
information about the qualities and attributes of an individual
that also includes cooperativeness [15,16]. Reputational infor-
mation can be used to condition behaviour towards an
interaction partner. Furthermore, it can determine access to
partner choice and reproduction as well as to material and to
immaterial resources (e.g. to power). The benefits of having a
‘good’ reputation can deter individuals from defection and
thereby foster the evolution of cooperation [17–19].
These processes do not take place in a social vacuum.
Human interactions are complex, as they are embedded in
social network structures. The local network ties that an indi-
vidual has are important for solving the problem of
cooperation for multiple reasons. First, the local network
structure provides the context of social interdependencies,
and large-scale cooperation is often scaled up from the suc-
cessful establishment of local cooperation. Second, network
ties provide the constraints of monitoring and controlling
behaviour. Third, they are also the channels of communi-
cation. Communication is a device for coordination, but
also for influence and persuasion towards doing the right
thing for the larger group. The advanced communication
capacities and social skills of humans allow us to disseminate
third-party evaluations through gossip [14,20–22]. Gossip is
the method through which one learns the reputations of
others, and through which reputations are shared in the
absence of direct experience and observation. These processes
also sustain reputation-based cooperation in larger groups in
which not every interaction can be monitored [23–25].
In short, network ties impact cooperation through
multiple mechanisms. They can help the establishment of
reputations that are aligned with group-beneficiary action
but could potentially also be used to control the flow of, or
strategically manipulate, reputational information [26].
After a short introduction to the problem of cooperation,
we review work on the foundational elements of reputation-
based cooperation in humans. We start from the simplest
models that link reputation and cooperation, and then address
the impact of networks on cooperation, before finally dis-
cussing more complex models of their coevolution. We
conclude that the existing theoretical work on reputation and
cooperation has not fully accounted for the possible complex
interplay that emerges when social networks dynamically
change as a function of gossip and reputation (e.g. [27]).
While such dynamics pose many challenges, we argue that
progressing the field towards investigating the interactions
of reputation, gossip and network topology might help
to overcome the remaining puzzles of how networks can
ensure reliable reputation systems assisting the evolution of
cooperation. Such a programme also promises explanations
for when and why gossip and reputation dynamics have
adverse effects on cooperation, by fostering dishonesty,
by strategic manipulation attempts, or by giving rise to
parochial, group-bounded cooperation.2. The problem of cooperation
Cooperation is defined as a costly action to benefit another indi-
vidual, where the benefit b is higher than the cost c (with b > cand c > 0) [7]. What follows is that mutual cooperation leads to
higher social welfare than mutual defection. In other words,
working together creates synergies that exceed what individ-
uals alone are capable of. Yet, individuals are even better off
by reaping the benefits of cooperation without paying the
cost of cooperation themselves. This temptation to free-ride
on the cooperation of others introduces a ‘puzzle’: How can
cooperation emerge, given the risk of exploitation and,
concomitantly, the temptation to exploit?
Prominent theories in biology explain cooperation based
on kinship ([28,29], cf. [30]) and reciprocal interactions
[31–33]. While these theories apply to human cooperation
as well, the remarkable extent of large-scale cooperation
among non-kin observed in humans has shifted the atten-
tion to the role of social networks and communication for
sustaining cooperation.3. Reputation as a mechanism for solving the
problem of cooperation
Humans are able to observe the actions of others and exchange
information. This allows the evolution of cooperation through
mechanisms such as indirect reciprocity and reputation [12].
Communication and the ability to track reputation enable
decision rules like ‘if someone told me that you cooperated
with others in the past, I cooperate with you’. Cooperative
decisions that aremade conditional on transmitted information
(i.e. ‘reputation’) also allow the extension of cooperation
beyond dyadic relations. In a simple model, Nowak & Sig-
mund [11] showed that, if individuals base their decisions on
the so-called image score of the interaction partner, simply
operationalized as the number of times an individual helped
others in the past, cooperators can avoid exploitation by iden-
tifying free-riders pre-emptively. Testing Nowak & Sigmund’s
model experimentally, Wedekind & Milinski [34] have shown
that human participants are indeed sensitive to image scores
and cooperate conditionally onwhether the interaction partner
has a good reputation (i.e. high image score).
Once good reputation pays off, individuals have an incen-
tive to ‘invest’ in building it. Whether the expected benefits
exceed the costs of investment depends on the size of the
population, the reliability of the image score transmission,
the number of future interactions and whether reputation
provides a valid and reliable signal of cooperativeness in
the first place [35]. The latter is open to exploitation as indi-
viduals can increase their own reputation by buying ‘fake’
reputation (e.g. [36]). This means that reputation can be
increased artificially without actually engaging in costly
cooperation, enabling the exploitation of cooperators. Exper-
imental results highlight how important the validity of
reputation signals is and suggest that any reputation system
has to mitigate the presence of adverse incentives to control
and manipulate reputational information [37]. Recent studies
have also shown that reputation scores can lose their ability
to foster cooperation if they are assigned to groups rather
than individuals or when cooperation takes place in groups
rather than dyadic interactions [38,39].
Since the introduction of the ‘image score’ as a simplified
concept of reputation, different rules on how to assign repu-
tation based on past action have been proposed and analysed
(see e.g. [40–46]). Not all rules can sustain cooperation. From
all consensual attributions, only eight norms (the so-called
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3leading eight) that determine proper action and assignment
of good reputation have been shown to maintain cooperation
while being resistant to mutation and observation error
[44,45]. The joint properties of the leading eight norms are
that (i) they assign good reputation for cooperation by
actors with good reputation against others with good repu-
tation (maintenance of cooperation); (ii) they assign bad
reputation for defection against individuals with good repu-
tation (identification of defectors); (iii) they maintain good
reputation for actors with good reputation after defection
against individuals with bad reputation ( justified punish-
ment); and (iv) they assign good reputation for actors with
bad reputation if they cooperated with individuals with
good reputation (forgiveness) [44,45].
Reputation is an importantmechanism for the emergence of
cooperationnot only because itmight be the basis of conditional
cooperation, but also because it could be the basis of whom to
learn from [47]. When individuals with high reputation dis-
count the behavioural strategies of individuals with low
reputation, cooperation is further enhanced, especially if dis-
counting is based on absolute rather than on relative
reputation [47].
Most importantly, reputation can also be the basis of partner
choice [25,48–51]. Under ideal circumstances, reputational infor-
mation allows predictions about the likely action of other agents
in the population. Partner choice or ‘relational mobility’ allows
cooperative agents to seek out partners that have a ‘good’ repu-
tation and avoid agents with a ‘bad’ reputation. This creates
competition for the attention of other cooperators in so-called
biological markets in which agents compete to be selected as
interaction partners [52–56]. In theory, if reputation provides a
valid and unambiguous signal of an agent’s cooperativeness,
cooperators have a competitive advantage over defectors,
since they can exclusively interact with each other and gain
from the mutual benefits of cooperation.
Reputation, however, is not necessarily available publicly
or shared universally [57–62]. While individuals may observe
the actions of others, reputational information in humans is
often also transmitted through gossip [63–66]. Gossip allows
people to sustain cooperative behaviours through the spread
of negative reputation and the fear of retaliation [17], as
well as through the creation of coalitions and the exercise of
ostracism [16,22,25,67,68]. Yet, gossip can also be used strategi-
cally by sharing false information to damage the reputation of
others, raising the question of how groups evaluate gossip and
detect false accusations and strategic misinformation [69–72].
In addition to strategic lies, gossipmight entail a non-negligible
degree of noise (that is, unintended errors). Gossip information
can be wrongly communicated, impeding the correct trans-
mission of reputational information and leading to mistakes in
updating reputation of others [69,73]. Receivers may also
wrongly interpret gossip information, likewise increasing the
noise of reputational information [74,75]. Hess & Hagen [69]
provided evidence that people evaluate the veracity of gossip
information, for example, by assigning more credibility to
gossip information coming frommultiple, independent sources
or taking into account the relationship between the gossiper and
the gossip target, which can increase the reliability and validity
of gossip and reduce strategic gossip lies and unintended errors.
Such complexities are often not incorporated in formalized
theoretical models, but play an important role in social
groups, extend the function of reputation beyond simply identi-
fying free-riders or cooperators, and introduce noise andstrategic signalling, and psychological mechanisms to prevent
the spread of false gossip.4. Networks and cooperation
In large groups, people do not meet randomly, as assumed in
some theoreticalmodels for simplification.Human interactions
are embedded in social networks that determine the likelihood
with which two people meet, interact and exchange infor-
mation. A logical implication is that the structure of a
network could influence cooperation. Network topologies
and features like how segmented, dense, close-knit or centra-
lized a network might largely facilitate or hinder the
emergence of cooperation by constraining interactions or infor-
mation transmission that might occur (table 1). In this section,
we briefly review how networks can foster cooperation
through mechanisms other than reputation.
When the likelihood to meet and interact with people
remains unchanged over time, the ability to distinguish part-
ners and act according to their previous actions can enable
cooperation in networks [81–87]. A simple rule to foster
cooperation in networks relates to the ratio between benefits
b, costs c and individual degree d (d is the number of inter-
action partners that each agent has in the network). If b/c >
k, the evolution of cooperation is theoretically possible
without the need of reputation or strategic complexity [88].
People do not all occupy structurally identical positions and
social networks often display skewed degree distributions [89].
Degree heterogeneity [90] and scale-free networks in particular
have been shown to increase the chances of cooperation
[81,84,91–93], though they are also highly vulnerable to error
and deletion of nodes [94]. Realistic small-world structures
[95] were also found to provide better conditions for
cooperation [96]. Systematic investigations of topologies con-
firmed the superiority of structures in which hubs are
integrated in cohesive cliques while they are also linked else-
where [97]. Structural advantages are due to the benefits of
cooperation for hubs and bridging individuals, their larger
impact on the behaviour of others, the presence of ties and cor-
related behaviour among hubs, and high local clustering in
small-world networks [98–100]. These results initiated the
investigation of degree-based allocation policies that either
decrease the required investments or increase the payoffs or
aspirations of hubs in order to promote overall cooperation in
public good games [100–104]. The strategic positioning of initial
cooperators can shorten the time to achieve cooperation, but
their placement is non-trivial and depends on the exact game
and the network structure [105]. In addition, given their univer-
sal presence, highly centralized structures and hierarchical
networks have been analysed and the underlying asymmetries
found to maintain cooperation in models [106] and in exper-
imental work [107]. Stable hierarchies, however, could imply
the lack of motivation and investment in cooperation from
lower ranked individuals [108].
Theoretical models that investigated the evolution of
cooperation in structured populations, such as in space or in
lattices, observed the emergence of cooperation clusters in
the population where cooperators meet other cooperators
[109–115]. Experimental research, in contrast, suggests that a
structured population in itself is not sufficient to solve the
problem of cooperation in human groups ([116–119]; see also
[120]). The mismatch could be caused by the low benefit to
Table 1. Key network concepts relevant for cooperation.
concept definition/explanation visual representation
network segmentation the network can be partitioned into
unconnected components; no influence
on behaviour or on reputations is
possible between the components
network clustering/
modularity /segregation/
assortativity of nodes/the
small-world phenomenon
human networks are characterized by dense
and cohesive communities in which
individuals show a large amount of
similarity with each other (indicated by
node colour). These cohesive clusters
(modules) are loosely connected with
each other through bridging ties (dotted
lines), resulting in shorter network
distances and a small world [76,77].
influence and selection/
coevolution of networks
and cooperation
the behavioural similarity of individuals in a
community (cohesive subgraph) could be a
result of social influence (assimilation, social
learning) in informal relations or partner
selection based on homophily [78,79]
brokerage/betweenness/
centrality/power/social
control
individuals may be in a distinguished
network position such that they connect
otherwise unconnected others (brokers,
red), most information flows through
them (betweenness, yellow), can
influence many others (centrality, purple),
or can exploit the cooperation of others
(isolates, peripheral actors, blue)
network multiplexity human networks are multiplex, and
networks of interdependence,
communication and influence are just
partially overlapping
gossip a sender i communicating to a receiver j
about a target k who is absent or
unaware of the content [66]
k
ji
structural constraints on the
spread of reputations
the presence of certain network ties (e.g.
friendship between the receiver j and
target k, or a 2-path friendship tie of
j–l–k) makes (negative) gossip about k
by sender i to receiver j unlikely or
forbidden
(Continued.)
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Table 1. (Continued.)
concept definition/explanation visual representation
triadic closure/structural
holes
triadic closure (left) might be useful to
cross-check the validity of reputational
information received, while structural
holes (right) enable the in-flow of
information from independent sources
[80]
consensual reputation/
oppositional cultures
reputational information about an individual
may (top) or may not (top versus
bottom) be consensual as different
subgroups may hold contradicting views
about someone’s reputation
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cost ratio in experiments [121], the share and positioning
of initial cooperators in the network [105], the individual
tendency to cooperate conditionally on the number of coopera-
tive acts of others irrespective of payoff benefits [120] or
learning the benefits of free-riding from others leading to a
decay of cooperation in any structural setting.
Theoretical work and numerical simulations pinpoint
dynamic strategy update rules that can promote cooperation
in networks [98,122,123]. Unconditional, proportional or
imperfect imitation strategies foster cooperation [109,124]
more than innovative strategies, such as the myopic best
response rule [125]. Mixing imitative and innovative dynamics
is detrimental to cooperation near phase transitions and leads
to the downfall of cooperation [126]. A general conclusion is
that networks do not support or inhibit cooperation, but their
impact depends on the micro-level mechanisms characterized
by the strategy update rules individuals employ [124,127],
Results from statistical physics highlight the robust and univer-
sal features of phase transitions in problems of cooperation in
networks [98,121,122,128,129], the impact of noise [130],
mutations [131,132], punishment [129] and quenched distri-
bution of types—which slows down relaxation towards the
stationary state extremely [133]—therein.
This brings us to the role of dynamic social networks for the
evolution of cooperation. People do not always interact or com-
municatewith an unchanging set of partners. They can attempt
to cut ties to previous interaction partners and form new ties
(figure 1). This means not only that human interactions are
embedded in social networks, but that social networks also
change and evolve as a result of social interactions. Theoretical
and experimental work has shown that dynamic social net-
works, labelled also as adaptive networks, in which agents
can endogenously influence the network structure by cutting
and forming social ties, foster cooperation [94,128,134,138–
150] and the positive impact of tie dynamics could even spill
over to static parts of the network [151]. The impact of network
structure on cooperation depends on the rules and character-
istics of dynamic network updates. Cooperation can prevail
also in highly unfavourable conditions if strategy adaptation
is paired with selective creation of ties [152] or with randomcreation but selective deletion of ties [153]. Selection of links
that ensure higher payoffs in combination with adaptive strat-
egy update offers good chances for cooperation, leading to a
hierarchical network [138]. The endogenous development of a
strongly heterogeneous topology through mechanisms of
growth and preferential attachment [89] in which cooperators
can secure an advantageous structural position supports
cooperation [145,154]. While the role of hubs connected to
other hubs is central in this process as their behaviour is imi-
tated with high probability [93,154], cooperators might be
located also on nodes of intermediate degree unlike in static net-
works [155]. The key for the success of cooperation is that the
combination of tie updates and strategy updates must ensure
that cooperators directly avoid defectors [91,153,156,157] or
benefit from a self-organized informal leadership structure
[128,138,139,145].
Whilemost models assume that the network of interactions
and the network of learning (strategy adoption) are identical
and every relation is of equal strength, this is not necessarily
the case [98,158,159]. Multiplex networks (cf. table 1) that rep-
resent the complex texture of relationships and model
numerous layers that represent different social connections
help cooperation endure even when the costs for exploitation
are high [160]. Endogenous link updating in dynamic multi-
plex networks could lead to spontaneous symmetry breaking
in cooperation levels across the layers [161–163].
The heterogeneity in human exchanges depends on both
the diverse social circles people engage in (workplace, family,
friends and neighbourhoods) and the strength of the relation-
ships they create. The strength of social ties, meaning the
intensity of the relationship and the frequency of communi-
cations, acts as a mediator between the maintenance of
cooperation and network dynamics: the more robust the
links between cooperative people, themore cohesive the cluster
of cooperators and the lower the tolerance of defective beha-
viours [164,165]. That is, through the possibility to choose the
interaction partners by strengthening or weakening ties to
other agents in a dynamic social network, cooperation can be
sustained in both large and small populations [154]. Natural
self-organization patterns can dynamically change a social
(a) (b) (c) (d)
= / ?
?
Figure 1. Examples of how network dynamics could relate to cooperation and reputation. (a) Breaking relations (crossed ties) can be a form of punishment for
defection (left) [134,135] or low reputation (right) [136], which could also originate from cooperation with defectors; (b) asking for gossip about future interaction
partners might lead to creation of new ties (selection based on access to reliable information); (c) preferential attachment to individuals with high reputation (green
node); (d ) cooperation within a cohesive group of individuals might have negative externalities for out-group members, sharpening group boundaries and creating
parochial competition [137] which might force bridging individuals (red node) to choose sides.
(b) (e)(d)(c)(a)
i
i
i
k
i
i
i
i
i
i
j
j
j
j
j
j
k
k
k
k
k
k
k
j
Figure 2. Cooperation in networks and reputation. (a) Cooperation can emerge through direct reciprocity in dyadic relationships. (b) Individuals can transmit infor-
mation on past interaction partners to third parties, influencing their behaviour and allowing the evolution of cooperation through indirect reciprocity. (c) Often,
individuals are engaged in complex social networks with cooperative or uncooperative relationships. (d ) The transmission of information can influence actions and
relationships. Importantly, information in the form of gossip does not need to be correct, allowing strategic (mis)information. The transmission of reputational
information through network ties raises the question of how conflicting information from different sources is integrated. (e) Agents that have a central position
in the network have more channels to transmit information and, hence, may have more influence on the ties of other agents and the evolution of the network.
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network and induce the spontaneous emergence of coopera-
tive clusters and help populations to become resistant to the
invasion of free-riders [146,166,167]. Furthermore, when the
network contains both positive and negative ties, network
dynamics towards structural balance (e.g. ‘a friend of a friend
becomes a friend’ and ‘the enemy of a friend becomes an
enemy’) could efficiently drive the network towards in-group
cooperation and cohesion [46,168–170].5. Reputation transmission in networks
Beyond the direct relationship between networks and
cooperation, reputation-based cooperation is also shaped by
networks (figure 2) and networks also change as a result of
reputation processes. Reputation affects both cooperation
and network formation [120,171].
A useful framework to highlight how reputation is
constructed in social networks comes from studies on the diffu-
sion of information in networks [172], from the literature on
learning in networks (e.g. [173]) and from network models ofopinion dynamics (e.g. [174,175]). From this perspective, repu-
tation in networks can be understood as arising from social
influence, that is, as resulting from the communication between
people that reinforces each other’s views. A ‘shared evalu-
ation’, as opposed to knowledge sharing, likely contains less
certainty and requires more social proof, such as receiving
the same information from multiple sources. This implies
that for reputational information to get transmitted to others,
a single source may not be sufficient [80]. Network models of
reputation have been proposed to evaluate the reliability
of multiple information sources [176–178]. In contrast with
models on contagious diseases and information in general,
which spread only by contact (a simple contagion), reputa-
tional information may be a ‘complex contagion’, i.e. it
requires confirmation from multiple sources to be believed
and potentially acted upon [172;179, p. 35].
This means that an exposure to reputational information
does not immediately imply its acceptance and transmission
to others; rather it requires multiple sources of confirmation.
This is especially true when the source of reputational infor-
mation is someone socially distant (several links away in
royalsocietypublishing.org/journal/rstb
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in situations in which those involved may have strategic
incentives to misrepresent reputational information (i.e.
spread of false gossip). Therefore, networks that are character-
ized by high triadic closure, clustering and strong ties should
facilitate complex contagions better than network structures
with structural holes (open triads), low clustering and
weak ties [179,180], because the former allow informational
cross-checking and updating.
Extrapolating from this approach, it is likely that the trans-
mission of reputational information might differ depending on
the relevance and social (network) distance of the individual
whose reputation is under discussion (target). Evidence
shows that friendship and work ties influence individuals’
propensity to engage in gossip [181,182]. Furthermore, the
quantity and quality of the information shared shape
individuals’ reputation: high gossip activity decrease people’s
popularity in the network [183], while gossipers acquire a
moral reputation when sharing diagnostic and adequate infor-
mation that helps to identify others as trustworthy or not [184].
Thus, gossip not only influences the reputation of actors in a
social network as ‘good’ or ‘bad’ interaction partners. Individ-
uals in a network can also acquire a reputation as trustworthy
or untrustworthy information providers. Such meta-reputa-
tions may help to avoid the spreading of false gossip and
reduce noise. Our empirical knowledge, however, is still lim-
ited on how reputation is disseminated in the social network
and to what extent contagion is susceptible to noise in various
network topologies, and why an individual could have differ-
ent reputations in different subsets of the population, as well as
how individuals’ reputations change based on the information
they share.6. The interplay of networks, reputation and
cooperation
The complex interplay of networks, reputation and
cooperation is such that no simple directionality can be
assumed, since all three elements influence each other. Conse-
quently, attempts to grasp the dynamic connections between
networks and reputation mechanisms and their impact on
cooperation so far have been limited. This holds for integrative
theoretical agendas in general, and formal modelling efforts in
particular. Both have to disentangle not only the multiplex
social ties connecting and the reputational information flowing
between the actors in the triad (sender, receiver and target), but
also their differential effect on each actor’s reputation and
cooperative behaviour. Amajor challenge is capturing themul-
titude and interrelatedness of potential mechanisms through
which networks and reputation may affect cooperation (see
[16] for a fuller discussion). Here, we review recent efforts at
capturing this dynamic interplay, whether with models or by
observational work.
(a) Intragroup contexts
Some agent-based simulations, experimental studies and
field studies have ventured into the coevolution of networks,
reputations and cooperation. Partner selection plays a key
role in these studies. For example, in a model where individ-
uals interact in their local network, cut ties with individuals
of low reputation and establish new relations with nearbyindividuals with the highest reputation (or with a random
agent), free-riders get abandoned and stable and high levels
of cooperation emerge parallel with a highly cohesive net-
work structure [136]. This line of research follows up on
early modelling work on ‘prisoner’s dilemma networks’
[185,186] and matches with the results of analytical work
that analyses equilibria in games on networks [187].
Experiments also found that dynamics of partner updates
based on reputational information lead to high assortativity
and stable cooperation [147]. The knowledge of the network
structure along with reputational information may be a
driver of cooperation and imply the emergence of dense and
clustered networks [171]. Other studies have found that
cooperation levels increasewhenmore frequent partner updat-
ing is allowed (e.g. [134,156]). Large-scale online experiments
have also attempted to dissect the complex interplay of net-
work dynamics, reputations and cooperation. It has been
found that while reputation information is important for part-
ner choice, it might not even be necessary, and cooperation can
be sustained by network dynamics alone [27].
It is important to note that these coevolution models
show that the boundary between reputation and punishment
mechanisms is fuzzy at best. Some interpret indirect recipro-
city models as in line with (passive) punishment models,
since the exclusion of low-reputation players from future
exchanges can be seen as a sanction [136]. This is also seen
in experimental models with dynamic networks, in which
this mechanism is referred to as ‘out-for-tat’ [185,186].
Field studies portray a less straightforward picture, owing
to intertwined processes of social influence and partner selec-
tion (table 1, third row), and in particular, the complex
coevolution of networks of cooperation and social status
[188], or networks, gossip and reputation [189,190]. For
example, a series of studies among employees in Dutch organ-
izations found that partner selection strongly depends on three
partner characteristics: (i) the degree to which a potential part-
ner has disclosed reputational information about others, i.e.
individuals prefer to build ties to those colleagues who have
shared negative third-party gossip with them [183], (ii) the
power reputation of potential partners, i.e. individuals prefer
to build close interpersonal relations with those colleagues
whom they deem informally influential [191], and (iii) the
degree to which a potential partner actually occupies an influ-
ential brokerage position in the informal network [192]. Finally,
partner selection is also strongly influenced by self-monitoring
capacity of the selecting party [193], with high self-monitors
being more likely than low self-monitors to befriend those
whom they or others perceive as powerful [191].(b) Intergroup contexts
Intergroup contexts further complicate reputation dynamics and
its role in establishing cooperation. A group is a bounded collec-
tion of interacting individuals who are interdependent to a
certain degree [194]. In informal relations, group boundaries
can be ambiguous, though they could be well approximated by
detecting a relatively high density of network relations within
the group and relatively few ties to members outside the group
(e.g. [195–198]).Often, a shared identity binds in-groupmembers
together, excludingothers.Groupmembership is associatedwith
parochial cooperation, i.e. high in-group cooperation and low
out-group cooperation [137,199–202]. These tendencies are sup-
ported by various theoretical accounts, such as social identity
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Phil.Trans.R.Soc.B
376:20200297
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city and parochial altruism ([203–207]; for an overview of these
theories, see [208]). Though several experiments have demon-
strated the importance of social identification for in-group
favouritism and in-group cooperation [200,201], experiments
have also shown that people cooperate more both with in-
group and out-group members when their reputation is at
stake (e.g. [209–211]). Not only do people earn reputation from
their cooperation, but their reputation may also be affected by
their group membership and the actions of group members, as
group reputation can be formed from the aggregate of individual
reputations [38,39,212–214]. Such group reputations do not help
to sustain cooperation with out-group members and generally
lead to out-group discrimination [38,201].
One benefit of integrating network dynamics and
cooperation is that groups do not have to be assumed to be
exogenously given in the first place. Rather, models can allow
for the dynamic emergence and dissolution of groups (e.g.
[215]) and discrimination (e.g. [216]). Gross & De Dreu [46] pro-
vide an agent-based model where agents have personal
information onothers’ cooperativeness, gossip and use the repu-
tations learnt heuristically when deciding to cooperate with
others. Applying the four reputation heuristics in structural bal-
ance theory, they found that groups emerged dynamically and
displayed parochial cooperation; whereas reputation-based
partner selection enhanced within-group cooperation, it
impeded the emergence and stability of system-wide
cooperation. Such models demonstrate that groups can emerge
through learning, reputationandgossip, and that these constrain
cooperation to certain clusters in a network.
These results are generally supported by behavioural
experiments in the laboratory (e.g. [37,134]), and in real-
world contexts (e.g. [217–219]). Parochial structures, echo
chambers and subgroup polarization may arise when net-
works and reputations evolve endogenously, increasing the
likelihood of in-group loyalty, group-exclusive cooperation
and intergroup competition. Further modelling and exper-
imental studies are required, which will help elucidate when
parochial cooperation becomes entrenched, in processes such
as group polarization, and when intergroup tolerance and
cooperation are sustained.7. Outlook
Reputation and networks provide paths to large-scale
cooperation. Much theoretical and empirical research has
been dedicated to understanding the role of reputation and
networks for cooperation in isolation and apart from each
other. Human cooperation, reputation, and network formation
are clearly interrelated. Consequently, the complex causal lin-
kages between reputation, cooperation and networks have
gained increasing attention in the literature recently. Investi-
gating the interplay of dynamic social networks and
reputation information that is (imperfectly) transmitted
through gossip is challenging, from both a theoretical and an
empirical perspective. What complicates matters is that indi-
viduals can have strategic incentives to spread false gossip
[69–71], raising the question of how the validity of reputational
information is secured in networks. As individuals associate
with groups and attribute reputations also based on group
stereotypes, group-bounded parochial cooperation could be
the result of reputational dynamics. Investigating the complexinterplay of social networks and reputation may, however,
be fruitful as it could reveal unexpected emerging dynamics
that help explain when or why cooperation remains group-
bounded, in what situations networks ‘polarize’, or when
cooperation may break down even under conditions that
should theoretically favour cooperation. Here, we outline
further avenues and open questions for future research, with
a particular focus on the issue of complexity, which could be
addressed by combining different methods, theoretical
viewpoints and strengthening interdisciplinary collaborations.
One important open question is what determines the
stability and efficiency of reputations and how eroding or develop-
ing reputations associates with the maintenance of cooperation.
While cooperation has been associatedwith the convergence on
consensual reputations, competition for reputation has also
been shown to be an important driver of group-beneficial
action. These two views are to a certain degree contradicting
and could be reconciled in subsequent research. As competitive
altruism theory suggests, competition could exhaust individual
efforts and investmentswhile the relative reputational positions
remain unaltered, resulting in Red Queen dynamics [220] with
the positive externality of large-scale cooperation [53,221–223].
At the other extreme, we also have limited knowledge on
those network processes that contribute to the maintenance of
false reputations, their reinforcement and the maintenance
of suboptimal collective outcomes. The many examples of the
Emperor’s Clothes are illustrated by theoretical and empirical
work [224,225], though these studies are more focused on the
emergence and persistence of unpopular norms and beliefs
than on cooperation.
Cooperative behaviour may also be simultaneously motiv-
ated by both network structure and reputational concern.
Observational studies by behavioural ecologists of food shar-
ing and other forms of cooperative behaviour have broadly
found that multiple mechanisms appear to be operating sim-
ultaneously (e.g. [226–232]). Generous acts may help both to
reinforce particular interpersonal relationships, and to build
reputational standing [54,233–236]. Taking an explicit net-
works perspective, studies of Lamaleran whale hunters
[230,231] and of Canadian Inuit [232] found evidence for
reputational signalling, reciprocity and clustering. Ready &
Power [232] particularly note how norms of giving and of
reciprocity can help to entrench those who wield particularly
influential network positions and hold political power.
Another issue is relational multiplexity. When consider-
ing real social systems, it is nearly impossible to separate
communicative acts and communication networks that may
spread reputational information from the underlying social
relations the same individuals may be involved in. In other
words, networks of exchange and networks of information
sharing—both of which may foster cooperation—are co-occur-
ring and mutually overlapping. Social relations are generally
multiplex, such that the pathways through which
reputational content may flow will often be the same ones
through which cooperative exchanges occur [160,162]. This
entanglement inevitably adds further complexity to the process
by which cooperation may be fostered. A multiplex network
perspectivemay offer a unifying framework for further empiri-
cal investigations into the study of cooperation, reputation and
networks, by defining different layers of ties in the same
system, e.g. ‘who cooperates with whom’, ‘who attributes
high/low reputation to whom’ and/or ‘who shares a repu-
tation evaluation about a third party with whom’ ‘who is in
royalsocietypublishing.org/journal/rstb
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respectively, so that they can be studied simultaneously. Like-
wise, future research needs to consider the complex realities
of group membership: individuals hold multiple identities
[237] inmultiplex social networks [238]. Appreciating thismul-
tiplexity—and the possibility for the same relationships to have
both informational andmaterial exchanges—will be crucial for
further advancing our understanding of cooperation [238].
For all network and reputation processes in human
cooperation, the social context, in particular, variations in the
institutional and intergroup settings, matters. Cooperation is
not only maintained through mechanisms of relational mobi-
lity and reputation, as outlined in this review. Groups also
establish sanctioning systems based on implicit or explicit
rules and develop norms of reciprocity [239–241], which can
be enforced through partner choice and ostracism, revealing
a link between institutions and dynamic social networks.
The degree to which networks can sustain or undermine
cooperation through reputation, therefore, also depends on
the institutional context [242], and on the acceptance and stab-
ility of informal and formal institutions that safeguard the
maintenance of cooperation [243]. The institutional safeguards
themselves have developed on the fundamentals of informal
networks and reputation through human history [244–247].
Individual differences are also important in understand-
ing the adaptive function of reputation in networks. People
differently manage their reputation depending on whether
or not they value collective payoffs and the future [14],
while there is also inter-individual variation in reputation
domains (such as prosociality and competency, [248]), with
concomitant effects on cooperation. Actors experience differ-
ent socialization processes based on characteristics such as
gender that influence the networks of exchange and infor-
mation sharing described above. Although there is some
evidence for overarching patterns, such as men are more
likely to engage in competitive altruism than women (see
[249] for a meta-analysis of sex differences), it is likely that
these hold for specific domains. What might be more infor-
mative is focusing on differences in status and relationship
history within gender (e.g. [250]) or age group (e.g. [251]).
Relatedly, research on the detection and recall of reputationand cooperative behaviours will elucidate proximate mechan-
isms underpinning the processes discussed in this review; see
[46,120,252,253] for work on memory effects.
Finally, as our review has shown, empirical work in this
field is based on awide variety of methods. Agent-based simu-
lation can extend analytical theoretical work in highlighting the
macro consequences of micro mechanisms and structural
dynamics (e.g. [68,254–256]). Laboratory and field experiments
can provide tests for simple hypotheses in controlled environ-
ments (e.g. [60,120,257,258]). Field experiments can use games
that consider the complexity of individual and group relations
in real-world settings (see [259]). The analysis of reputation
mechanisms in onlinemarkets can provide insights into the effi-
ciency of regulatory practices and could be used to test
hypotheses on a massive scale (e.g. [260–264]). Historical data
and field observations (e.g. [218,235,265–267]) could provide
detailed insights on the build-up and functioning of reputation
mechanisms for cooperation in unique contexts and could high-
light both the universal character and myriad variegations
across human societies. This methodological variety of empiri-
cal work demonstrates the added value of cross-disciplinarity.
Future research is likely to benefit not only from further embra-
cing this methodological pluralism, but also from strengthening
the field’s methodological and empirical foundations through
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